This paper presents results of applying the minimax eigenvalue decomposition (MED), a morphologytype transform, that hides data within digital images as part of a flexible, computationally robust algorithm. This new algorithm presents a general method for hiding information within an image, although the strength of this algorithm lies in authentication. Authentication is the establishment of ownership of digital information, and is a type of watermarking. While no self-authenticating techniques are currently known, the algorithm presented here provides a certain level of self-authentication regardless of the particular information embedded in the data.
INTRODUCTION
Steganography, or information hiding, is the study of methods to hide data within a medium. Handwritten communications, digital images, digital video and digital music are examples of various media in which data can be hidden. Applications of steganography to digital media include data authentication and watermarking, and creating digital signatures for data. These methods involve the transmission of information available to the public over public channels. When steganography is used to transmit information by a public medium, and a private and often unknown audience is the sole intended recipient of that information, a covert channel is created.
Research in steganography is on the rise. Companies are seeking to protect digital information from piracy from many avenues of attacks, as the internet has made information more readily accessible to the professional as well as the common computer user. Unfortunately, unlike paper copies, digital reproductions of information can be made without degrading the quality of the information. Hence, information can be reproduced ad infinitum. This presents a problem for producers of digital goods, such as digital music, digital images, and digital text, since copies can be created with no loss in quality.
Steganography, cryptography, and covert channels are three techniques used to protect information while at the same time subverting restrictions on the transaction of information. Digital watermarking [3] , is an application of steganography where digital information is placed within data to allow an owner to verify its authenticity. Authentication [12] , or the establishment of ownership of information, is an important application of digital watermarking. The authenticity of information is established by either making the embedded information or the algorithm for inserting or removing the information unique to the owner. Sometimes the uniqueness of an algorithm is established through the existence of keys, which are specific pieces of information necessary to recover the hidden information that can be tied both to the owner of information and to the information itself. Cryptography [12] , on the other hand, is concerned with the creation and retrieval of scrambled information. Protection from unauthorized access is dependent upon the strength of the algorithm used to scramble the information. One use of cryptography is the creation and interpretation of digital signatures [12] , or visible information embedded within the digital data, created with the sole purpose of verifying the identity of a user and relating that user to a particular piece of information, such as a contract. The difference between a digital signature and a digital watermark is that a digital watermark is designed to protect Part of the SPIE Conference on Mathematics of Data/Image Coding. Comoression. and Encryotion the author of information, whereas a signature is intended to protect the receiver of information. The recipient of a document gains no advantage from the removal of a digital signature [9] . In covert channels, data is embedded using a steganographic algorithm in order to transmit private information rather than authenticate ownership. Media such as image data, sound data or the access times of files, can be used as covert channels.
There are two basic approaches used in covert channels: frequency-based techniques and spatial domain techniques. Frequency-based methods are more robust but can provide difficulties when retrieving embedded information [4] . Spatial techniques provide ease of retrieval but are less robust. A spatial method of steganography for images breaks an image into rectangles of pixels, embedding a mark or information in particular rectangles that follow the detail of the image [7] . A method for sound spreads information across frequencies of music data and uses that information to identify the owner of a musical selection [8] . A method called Patchwork [2] takes advantage of statistical properties of an image by embedding an imperceptible, specific statistic (one that has a Gaussian distribution) within a digital image. Another method takes a frequency transform of an image, embeds a watermark, and performs the inverse frequency transform to produce an image containing hidden data [3] .
Our technique differs from most techniques in that the embedded information isn't the only piece of information needed for authentication, and if the message is corrupted authentication can still occur. Selfauthentication is the ability of data to be authenticated without third party intervention. No method of steganography has been found to provide self-authentication. For example, no method exists that cannot be rendered useless either by corrupting embedded data or by placing a second mark over an already embedded mark, making the first mark unreadable. These attacks are thwarted by the existence of third parties that can verify the previous existence of a mark. However, methods used by third party companies like Digimarc©, ARTS Technologies©, and MediaSec Technologies LLC© do not claim to be self-authentication methods.
This paper focuses on hiding information within digital images. The method uses an image transform called the minimax eigenvalue decomposition (MED), which decomposes an image into layer images without the computational and roundoff penalties encountered in typical linear transforms such as the singular value decomposition [10] . The MED transform combines message data and a subset of the layer images produced by the transform to create an image that is "close" to the original image. The algorithm for combining the data and the selected layers yields keys useful for authenticating an image, even if the embedded data is tampered with.
This algorithm is believed to be weak if an image is to be used as a covert channel. However, this algorithm is believed to be strong if one wants to prove ownership of an image. Because the keys produced by the algorithm are not dependent on the data stored by the algorithm, authentication can be accomplished even if the data is tampered with, provided a trusted record of the keys exists. Although gray-value images are used in this thesis, the algorithm is based on a matrix transform, making it useful for any image converted into a matrix of pixel values, including color images. The amount of space available for storing a hidden message using this algorithm is dependent on the image used and the data stored.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: definitions and mathematical preliminaries necessary to describe the MED transform and the steganography concepts are given next, followed by a discussion of the transform and of the proof that motivated the data-hiding algorithm, as well as the data-hiding algorithm itself. Then examples of images processed by the algorithm are shown, followed by an analysis and discussion of the results.
MINIMAX EIGENVALUE DECOMPOSITION
Dividing an image into a sequence of images for transmission or storage purposes is not new. The singular value decomposition (SVD) is well known, and has been used for this when applicable. The SVD, however, has computational difficulties that cannot always be overcome if accuracy or computational efficiency is a concern. In [1 1] there is an alternative to those computational difficulties through the use of a new transform: the minimax eigenvalue decomposition (MED). Much of the mathematical foundations for the MED can be found in [4] , and discussions to image processing applications can be found in [6] , [10] , and [13] .
A discussion of the MED transform is presented next. We assume the reader is familiar with the SVD. For more details on the SVD, see [13] . The MED discussion is a presentation of work done in [11] .
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Similarly, we will use A to represent the minimum of two numbers, with A B defmed accordingly. Now, define A as the negative transpose ofA. The matrix U = A A* has been proven [4] to have the property that each column ofA is an eigenvector of U corresponding to eigenvalue 0. In other words, uJ a' = a', where a' represents the i-th column ofA, and hence U A =A.
The MED of an m x m matrix A can be written as A= UDV,
This transform avoids inaccuracies in eigenvalue computation since every eigenvalue is zero. Furthermore, we can represent A as a composition of the matrices u' (v)t:
where (vi)t= a,, if a, represents the i-th row of A. Hence, the above equation changes to: A = v1u Eaj.
We call each u' a matrix a layer of A. Each u' a, pair is an m x m matrix, and the pointwise max operation of all m layers is equivalent to the original m x m matrix A. These are analagous to the d,u'(v')' elements in the SVD transform discussion. We shall call these elements layers as well.
In the SVD transform, it is trivial to obtain the best approximating subset of k layers for a given k n after the difficult task of obtaining the eigenvalues and eigenvectors has been accomplished. In the MED transform, there is no eigenvalue computation since they are all zero, and the U matrix computation is trivial. The determination of a set of the k best approximating layers for a given k, however, is not trivial. The measure that follows provides the basis for finding k best layers. Hence, the accuracy of reproduction is not a concern. The following algorithm is discussed in [11] . Define a measure s(A,B) as follows:
c, where
Now, for the process that orders the layers, we have this algorithm:
Ordering algorithm 1) Find u' a = min(s(A, U' a1), 1 i m). Name this pair u' and a1.
2) Suppose you have found the firstj (j 1) eigenvector pairs. Now, find a and a, such that:
Rename this pair as u and aj+i. Furthermore, let us defme A as follows:
We call A the jth reconstruction of A.
3)
Set j = j + 1 and repeat steps 2 and 3 until j = m.
In addition, it is straightforward to show that AJ A for each j= 1 , . . ., m. This information is crucial in producing our stegoimage, as we will see in section 3. The next example illustrates the process discussed above. Our focus will not be on simply reconstructing images. We want to store data within the reconstructions. The theorem discovered and proven in [1] provides a method to measure just how much space each reconstruction provides for data storage.
Theorem
This theorem is instrumental in providing the user with a way to determine which pixel locations in the image can be used to store message data. We will use this theorem to aid in defense against attacks as well.
Theorem(Allen): Let A be an m x m matrix. Let A be the jth reconstruction ofA. Then, A will contain at least j rows ofA. More specifically, if thejth reconstruction ofA is Aj = v1(u Jaak), where fk aak U as., ti E {1 , 2, ...m), i E {1 , 2, ...j ), then A will contain at least the rows t1, t2, ... t of A.
In other words, we can track precisely where we have locations available for storage. Since A A, and we know that at least thej rows t1, ... ,tj ofA3 are exactly the same as thej rows t1, ... ,tj ofA, the remaining rn-f rows ofA potentially have individual pixel values that are less than or equal to A (since A A). It is in these rnj rows that the storage algorithm, presented in section 3, will try to hide the message data.
PRODUCING A STEGOIMAGE
Producing a stego image goes as follows. Produce a layer image. Then, scale every negative pixel location in the layer image to 0. Next, in locations where the layer image contains values different from the analagous locations in the original image, place data from the message data file. Do this by taking the difference per location between the original image and the layer image. Then, calculate the minimum number of bits required to hold these difference values. For example, if a difference value at a particular pixel location between the original image and the layer image is 17, the minimum number of bits required to hold that value would be 5. Finally, strip one less bit per location than can actually be stored from the message data file and add the value obtained to the value contained in the layer image pixel location. In the example above, we would then strip four bits from the message data file and add the value contained in those four bits to the value contained in the layer image pixel location used.
More formally, let A be the original image, A the jth layer, A7 the jth layer with all negative values removed, B the matrix of difference values between A and A7, C the matrix containing the number of bits required per location to store the difference values, and D the matrix whose values are one less than C wherever C is positive. The following example will illustrate the storage process. Take an image A and compute A3 for some j.
2)
Compute the image = A3 * X>0(A). The indicator threshold is T = 0, and thus the image A7 = {(af'),,}"zeroes out" the negative values in A3. The image D represents the number of bits from the message datafile that will be stored in the corresponding pixel location in the image A7. We have chosen to store one fewer bit per location than the maximum possible, to avoid producing image values > 255. Thus, for example, if d =5, then 5 bits from the message datafile will be stored (by integer addition) at location (0,0) in A7. From the Theorem, we know that nonzero values in D can only exist in rows r1, r2, ... rmj of D.
6)
Using a raster-scan order, we start at row r1, and we fmd the first entry dr1k where dr1k 1 . Then, the first dr1k bits are pulled off of the message datafile, and we compute We call A5 the stego image.
Here is a special case where no space is available for storage. 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The algorithm was run on a networked SGI workstation nrnning IRIX. The algorithm took approximately 1-1.5 wall-clock hours for the largest image, the 2 1 5x 2 1 5 image in Figure 3 . This algorithm was not coded for efficiency, so improvements could be made. Streakiness in the images is the most noticeable factor. The size of the image is typically directly correlated with the amount ofvisual streakiness: for a fixed j, as in this experiment, a large image will typically produce more streakiness. This is because a higher percentage ofrows are being used to store the message data in. For example, for Figure 3 , there are 215 -125 90 rows maximum where message data has the possibility ofbeing stored. For Figure 1 , however, there are only 53 such rows. Locations where message data is stored are most likely to differ from the original image in gray value. Note that the stego image in Figure 2 appears more streaky than the stego image in Figure 3 . Thus, the size of image cannot firmly predict which images will be more streaky.
The stego image in Figure lb is very close visually to its original image in Figure la . This is most likely due to the small amount of data stored in the image (a total of 2297 bits). However, while both the images in Figures 2 and 3 store approximately the same number ofbits, the stego image in Figure 2b has much more visual streaking than the stego image in Figure 3b . This is most likely due to the higher amount of gray-value contrast in Figure 2 . The difference measure value of 3.59in Figure 3 produces a stego image that appears visually close to its original image. Indeed, the stego image almost looks identical to the original image from a distance. (A closer look reveals streakiness apparent in the background and lower half of the stego image, however.) Compare this to the higher difference measure of 10.8 for the images in Figure 2 , whose stego image appears more streaky. Thus, while it appears these results show that a higher difference measure may predict more streakiness, this is not the case in general. This was certainly not true for the ten images given in [1] .
One idea for future analysis is to compare the average L1 measure to the difference measure. There may be properties ofthe way an image "looks" to the eye that can be determined through comparison ofthese two measures.
An interesting result of our storage algorithm is the evenness in average bits per location stored in each image. Almost every image averaged between 3 and 4 bits ofmessage data per storage location. (The image shown in Figure 1 is an exception to this rule, though.) This measure ofbits per storage location could be a useful measure for future exploration ofthe algorithm. There does not appear to be any correlation, however, between the value of the average number ofbits stored per image location and the value of the corresponding difference measure.
We believe the storage algorithm in section 3 to be useful for authentication purposes. Using this algorithm, there are three keys needed to authenticate a stego image: 1) the original image, 2) the level of reconstruction j, and 3) the order in which the data was placed within the image (raster-scan, raster-scan on a rotation, etc). Without the original image and the level ofreconstruction used to store data, it would be very difficult for an attacker to claim the image as their own. Even if another mark was embedded within the image via some other technique, it could be proven that the stego image was altered. Since we know which rows of the original image are included intact within any particular reconstruction and which ones are not, and since we know what was stored within a reconstruction, we have two pieces of evidence to validate our ownership of an image. Unfortunately, this technique may not work as well as a standalone technique. Some trusted third party that could record the level ofreconstruction and the original images would be necessary.
Another way this technique could be used is as an authentication tool between two parties. If a person intercepted an image being used for communication between two people and compromised it, proving that the image was compromised would not be a difficult task. Because an attacker would not know the level of reconstruction used in the storage of the message data, he or she would have to attack the stego image as a whole. However, if a recipient knows the original image and the level of reconstruction, he or she can check to make sure that rows that should be included from the original image in a particular level of reconstruction are identically reproduced in the stego image. If they are not, one can suspect an outside influence. Again, having the original image and having the level ofreconstruction provide strong authentication tools for any two people trying to communicate.
One could even store multiple copies of one mark within an image at different valid locations. Suppose, for instance, an attack was initiated where the least significant bits of an image were randomly rearranged. A person can not only show that the image was altered, but may be able to recover the original data stored. Several copies of the mark would exist within the stego image that could be compared against one another. The copies of the mark could be stored at well-chosen locations, where at most one or two of the copies could be affected by such an attack, for instance. Enough copies could be embedded to prevent against the majority of those copies being affected by such an attack. Hopefully, this method could be used to correct any errors that might have been introduced.
As a covert channel, this technique is not as robust, as a message can be compromised in much of the same ways as a message can be compromised if stored using any other technique. However, as a method of authentication, we believe that this method can be very strong. It provides two levels of authentication that are difficult to get around: the fact that the original image exists and the level of reconstruction. Unfortunately, if someone had the original image, they could run a brute force attack to find which level the stego image was reconstructed to. However, this does not mean that they will be able to access the mark, because they don't know the storage algorithm used to hide the mark or marks.
